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 PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE: Good morning. 
Thank you so much for coming to the annual symposium of 
the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy. My name is Penny 
White, and I have the distinguished opportunity to faculty 
advise this law [journal], the Tennessee Journal of Law and 
Policy. And that's why I am here today. I get the experience 
of working with incredible students at the College of Law. 
And one of those is Sean Francis, who is this year's 
Symposium Editor. I'm going to turn it over to Sean who will 
introduce our keynote address speaker. However, as you all 
know Micki, I have reminders for you from Micki before we 
get started. 
 Reminder number one, because of the crowd some of 
you will be sending in your big $25 check for CLE fees later. 
That's fine. But if you don't turn in your attendance report 
before you leave today, she will not give you credit. So you 
have that separate attendance report. Be sure and make sure 
                                                 
 Dan Kahan is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law and Professor 
of Psychology at Yale Law School. In addition to risk perception, his 
areas of research include criminal law and evidence. Prior to coming to 
Yale in 1999, Professor Kahan was on the faculty of the University of 
Chicago Law School. He also served as a law clerk to Justice Thurgood 
Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court (1990–91) and to Judge Harry 
Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
(1989–90). He received his B.A. from Middlebury College and his J.D. 
from Harvard University. 
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Micki gets that before you leave. 
 Secondly, we don't apologize for the crowd, we're 
delighted by the crowd. But the reason that we do not have 
an overflow room with this on a television for you and others 
to watch is that we simply don't have enough space at the 
College of Law today with all the classes going on to have 
an overflow room. So I hope you won't be too 
uncomfortable, and I hope you'll just still be glad that you 
came even after a crowded day. 
 So with no more ado, Sean Francis, who has put this 
thing together. 
 
 MR. SEAN FRANCIS: I would like to echo 
Professor White. The turnout is great. We're very happy to 
have all of you here. As she said, my name is Sean Francis. 
I'm the Symposium Editor for the Tennessee Journal of Law 
and Policy. 
 If I may, I would like to get just a few thank-yous 
out of the way. Of course, I would like to thank the 
University of Tennessee College of Law. They provided 
these facilities here for us to have the symposium. Without 
them, we would be meeting at a Waffle House somewhere 
and it would not be nearly as nice, so we appreciate that. 
 Along that same vein, I would like to thank Micki 
Fox, the CLE director. You guys know how much work she 
puts into these things; the registrations, the fees, putting 
together the credits for you guys, getting the verification for 
CLE for the credits. All of that is Micki, and more. So we 
definitely thank her for her help. I would also like to thank 
Jeff Groah, our audio/visual guy. He's back there in the back 
making sure everything is working well. If anything goes 
wrong, you can blame him, so get a good look at his face. 
It's not my fault. 
 And then I would also like to thank the Advocacy 
and Dispute Resolution Center. They're the ones who 
provided the financial backing for all of this. They funded 
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the little snacks that we have for you guys. All of the fees 
and registration that we had for this, all of that was them. So 
we would like to thank them. 
 And, finally, we would like to thank the Tennessee 
Journal of Law and Policy. They provided the manpower 
behind all of this. They organized all of this. And without 
them, none of this would have been possible. So if I can have 
just a short plug for the Journal, it was established in 2004. 
It produces twice yearly publications on the subject of law 
as it intersects with decision-making or policy-making. So 
any of you who work with lawmakers or who are lawmakers, 
or who work in the policy-making arena, it's a really great 
resource for all of you. And even if you don't, you're just 
interested in those topics, I would encourage you to check 
out the editions that we have out and the future editions that 
we will publish. 
 One more short housekeeping note about the 
schedule today. So the morning session—I'll just go over 
that now. We'll begin with Professor Kahan's address here in 
a few minutes after I introduce him. After which, we'll have 
a short fifteen minute break. And then we'll have a panel of 
experts and practitioners in the field of law who will come 
up and react to his speech and answer questions from the 
audience. So, please, think of your questions as they speak 
and as Professor Kahan speaks, and feel free to ask as many 
questions as you might have. 
 So without any further ado, I would like to introduce 
Dr. Dan Kahan. He is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of 
Law and Psychology at the University—at Yale University 
College of Law. He is also a member of the Cultural 
Cognition Project, which is a group of scholars who seek to 
analyze the impact of group values on perceptions and 
related facts. 
 And that's what he has generally come here to speak 
to us about today. So I would like to ask you to join me in 
welcoming Dr. Dan Kahan. 
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II. Keynote Address 
 
 PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: It was really just an 
honor to receive the invitation. And I want to thank the 
Journal and also Penny for giving me this opportunity. And 
actually, everybody has been really nice to me since I got 
here. And I'm sure that that reflects a sort of friendship 
[indiscernible]. [Laughter.] It's really great to have that kind 
of relationship with you. 
 Now, I saw what's been going on here just a little bit 
in today's politics, and it made me realize that really, if you 
want to get people to listen to you, you have to make a really 
bold claim. Right. So I'm going to make three really bold 
claims. Kind of give me a chance here and don't all rush me 
[indiscernible] that way. But one of them that's especially 
bold is that judges and lawyers, they don't see things the way 
that ordinary people do. Now, you're already kind of saying, 
come on. And so I'll just add a little proviso. They don't see 
things the way that the public does, well, except when they 
do. 
 Now, the second claim, bold claim, this is generally 
a good thing, that judges and lawyers think differently from 
ordinary people. You know, just give me a chance here and 
I'll qualify it a little. It's generally good, but sometimes it can 
also be bad. So those are my three very bold claims. And I'm 
going to make out these claims by going through a series of 
studies with you. And the first one actually has to 
acknowledge that it has roots in Tennessee. It's a study that 
initially we pretested within Justice Koch's fellow members 
of the Inns of Court in Nashville. So I don't know if that 
disqualifies him from being on the jury, actually the judge, 
the work. 
 Now, the paper that reports the results of this study 
has a title based off protests, which is an allusion to a famous 
study conducted in the 1950s where the researchers asked 
students from two rival colleges to watch the tape of the 
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football game between their two schools and decide whether 
the referee had made the right call or the wrong call on 
certain disputed calls during the game. And what they found 
is that the students from Dartmouth, they were all convinced 
that the official must be a referee of Princeton or something, 
he was so biased. And whereas the students from Princeton, 
they said, you know, what's going on? Did they bribe the 
referee? We can't believe he's this unfair. Right. So the 
students were conforming what they saw on the tape 
essentially to their institutional affiliation. And this is what's 
referred to in psychology as identity protective cognition. 
People are going to selectively credit the information with 
the arguments of the judgments about the credibility of the 
speaker, it could be the quality of scientific data, to the 
interest of some kind of special group. They're going to do 
that because they want to maintain their standing and status 
in the group. And if you take positions that are contrary to 
the other group members, well, then sometimes they might 
look down on you. Right. So this is identity protective 
cognition. And what we wanted to do was see whether this 
might actually apply in law. 
 But by the way, don't you see the one from 
Tennessee, he's clearly out of bounds. Right. I mean, I see it, 
so. But we thought, well, does this identity protective 
cognition actually influence how fact finders in law are 
performing their duties? So we took a sample, not of judges 
and lawyers as we did that day at the Inns of Court with Dean 
Koch, but just ordinary individuals. Two hundred people 
who were drawn from a Nashville panel, the kind of people 
who might be on a jury. And we told them, imagine you are 
on a jury and it's a suit by political protestors against the 
police, that a political protestor said that the police violated 
their First Amendment rights when they ordered them to end 
their demonstration. And the police on the other hand said 
that they weren't violating the First Amendment rights of the 
protestors. The protestors had crossed the line from speech 
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to intimidation, that they were waving their signs in a 
menacing fashion at passersby, screaming in their face. 
That's not protected by the First Amendment. And blocking 
access to the building that you see in the background. 
 Now, we have an experimental component in this 
study. We told half the people that the protest was happening 
at an abortion clinic and that the protestors were against the 
right to an abortion. And we told the other half of the sample 
that this demonstration was at a college recruitment center, 
and that the demonstrators were expressing their opposition 
to excluding gay and lesbian individuals from the military. I 
see we have some younger people, that's well before your 
time. Actually, that used to be the policy of the United States. 
It got changed. But we did our—we collected our data before 
President—then President Obama had changed that. 
 There were also laws that were specific to each one 
of the two conditions, right, so that the subject—study 
subjects for the abortion clinic condition, they were to apply 
a statute that says it's illegal to interfere with, to obstruct or 
intimidate or threaten people who are trying to access a 
facility where abortions are being given. And the police have 
the power if people—they see people doing that, to disperse 
them or else arrest them. And then similarly in the 
recruitment center condition, anybody who was interfering, 
intimidating, blocking or what have you, the access to a 
facility where military recruitment is going on, they're 
breaking the law and the police can stop that too. 
 Now, there was one other thing that we measured 
here; the cultural worldviews and problems of our subjects 
and just preferences about how society should be organized 
along two different dimensions, individualism, 
communitarianism, hierarchy, and egalitarianism. And we 
measure that by having the subjects respond with a graded 
scale to statements, do they agree with them or disagree with 
them and how strongly. Things like, it's not the government's 
business to try to protect people from themselves. It's kind 
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of an individualistic sensibility, or the government should 
put limits on the choices the individuals can make so that 
they don't get in the way of what's good for society. You're 
more collectivist if you agree with that, that our society 
would be better off if the distribution of wealth is more equal 
than to egalitarian. And then something like this, society as 
a whole has become too soft and feminine. Now, that's kind 
of a traditionalist view. 
 So that's how we measured the cultural outlooks. 
And for our purposes, the communities who have these 
combinations of values that are reflected in the two-
dimensional representation of the cultural worldviews, 
they're performing the same functions in our experiment as 
the students' college affiliations did, and they saw a gain, 
right. These are the groups who share these values with 
respect to which people are going to be judging by disputed 
evidence, in order to find that the status of their group in 
competition with other groups is actually predominant. 
 You have here the lawsuit by people who have 
distinctive, very strongly held and contested political 
positions, and that's going to put pressure on the study 
subjects to conform what they're seeing when they watch the 
tape to the outcome that's consistent with what their own 
group's values are. 
 And so here's what we saw. In the abortion clinic 
condition, the egalitarian individualists, they formed 
rather—well, they formed attitudes that were anti-protestor, 
like—either like egalitarian—kind of like libertarians. In 
their view, the police didn't go too far and shouldn't be 
enjoined from stopping this kind of demonstration in the 
future because of that, like the abortion protestors, that's 
what they thought they were, had crossed the line from 
speech to intimidation. 
 The higher up communitarians, in contrast, they 
thought that the police had clearly gone too far. And these 
are people who have more traditional values. They tend to 
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subscribe to the pro-life position, and for sure, the officers 
should be enjoined from doing this thing again in the future. 
Now, that was the response if they had been assigned to the 
abortion clinic conditions. 
 If they were assigned to the recruitment center 
condition, then they flipped around completely. All right. 
And we also, of course, have the egalitarian, 
communitarians, and the higher up individualists, they don't 
care that much about abortion, but they were clearly very 
polarized in the military recruitment condition. All right. 
 And the reason that they came to these conclusions 
is that they actually thought they were seeing different kinds 
of things. Right. People who have the—well, in any 
condition, people with one set of values would disagree with 
people who had other sets of values of whether, in fact, the 
protestors were blocking entry to the building and whether 
they were screaming in the face of onlookers. But across the 
conditions, right, people with the same values were 
disagreeing with each other. They are disagreeing with their 
counterparts in the other condition. If you thought you were 
watching the abortion condition, then you had very different 
reactions from somebody who had values like you in the 
military recruitment center condition. 
 All right. So people are conforming their 
impressions to the outcome that is most in line with their 
group's values. And you can see why this is going to be a 
problem for the First Amendment. I don't know if you 
recognize that the—does anybody get those Supreme Court 
advocate trading cards? Because here's—this is a woman 
who actually argued a case to the Supreme Court and won, 
and her name is Shirley.1 She's from the Westboro Church, 
which is a hate group, and they're very emphatic, that's 
exactly what they are, who hate gays, for example. And you 
see they used to go around to the funerals of soldiers who 
died fighting in Iraq or Afghanistan and they would say, 
                                                 
1 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
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well, this is vengeance by God for the United States being 
too tolerant of homosexual rights. And as you can imagine, 
that didn't make the parents of the soldiers feel very good. 
 So one of them sued the Westboro Church, right, for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and they got 
some big judgment. It was reduced on appeal, but not by 
much, like five million dollars. And so they're appealing to 
the Supreme Court, saying this is contrary to the First 
Amendment to punish us on these grounds. And, in fact, they 
won. I don't think that that's really a surprise because the 
theory of the case that they were—that was presented against 
them, it kind of runs headlong into one of the essential pillars 
of First Amendment law, the non-communicative harm 
principle. 
 See, the Court said: “The record confirms that any 
distress occasioned by the Westboro's picketing”2 —I mean, 
there's clearly distress, right, people are being severely 
traumatized by what they're doing. It “turned on the content 
in viewpoint of the message conveyed rather than any 
interference with the funeral itself.”3 And you recognize this 
because you can generalize it. If you regulate people 
engaged in speech activity, you have to have some goal or 
interest that can be defined independently of people just not 
liking the speech. It's not a cognizable harm that they were 
upset by the content of the speech—I mean, clearly, here the 
content of the speech is what upset the parents. 
 If the protestors had been saying, you know, 
welcome home, thank you, we appreciate your sacrifice, this 
wouldn't have happened. But if the harm is one that can be 
defined independently of First Amendment, then there's 
room for regulation. Interference with the funeral itself, 
right, they're blocking the procession and may be hitting 
people over the head with the sign, you can define the harm 
that's being inflicted there independently of whatever point 
                                                 
2 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 457. 
3 Id. 
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they were trying to make by speaking, or even whether they 
were speaking at all. All right. 
 So we have—have this important First Amendment 
principle. It's reflected in the two laws that I showed you. 
They're trying to identify the kinds of non-communicative 
harm that people can suffer when they're subject to 
intimidation and threatening and so forth. 
 But here's the problem, right, if when fact finders 
are trying to determine whether the conditions of those laws 
are consistent with the First Amendment have been satisfied, 
their perceptions are going to be sensitive to the values of the 
protestors. They're more readily going to find the non-
communicative harm principle to be satisfied when they 
don't like the message of the protestors than when they do. 
So in making these kinds of factual determinations under the 
influence or pressure of identity protective cognition, they're 
actually recreating a legal regime that determines whether 
people can engage in protests based on the values that they 
have. And that's really going to be a—prove to be a problem 
for the First Amendment. And some people think that's what 
the Supreme Court or even state courts are doing, they're 
being too political, maybe because they're reasoning in this 
way. And, I guess, you know, the question—  
 Did you say I could ask questions and quiz people 
or— 
  
 PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE: Sure. 
 
 PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: Do you think our 
study actually supports this anxiety on the part of the public 
that judges are, in fact, political in their ruling? Do you think 
it does? I mean, there's one—do you think so? 
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 PROFESSOR DAN KAHAN: Well, I thought you 
were raising your hand. You need to get into the action here.  
 But you see, you know, the study, I told you, we did 
it on lay people. I mean, not people with any legal training, 
much less judges, right. And it's not new to the law that 
sometimes people are going to be biased politically and that 
it might even unconsciously affect their judgments. That's 
why you have strict scrutiny of laws that abridge the First 
Amendment, whether it's incidentally or not to see, well, 
were people really motivated by something else that they're 
not expressing here? We train the prospective lawyers to be 
able to apply these rules. 
 Now maybe—maybe the judges are going to be 
affected in the same way, but it's a question begging given 
that the judges that have been trained and allowed to 
experience the kinds of reasoning that lawyers do. They say, 
well, you must be like the public. And that's exactly what 
they're going to do, they're kind of checking influences in the 
public. 
  The only way we can figure out whether judges are 
going to react similarly is to do a study with judges in it. All 
right. So here's the second study. They saw a statutory 
ambiguity. And in this one, we had members of the public, 
students, lawyers and judges. Right. It was a fifteen hundred 
member sample, and we had all of these groups so we could 
kind of make some comparative judgments. And it's about 
ambiguous statutes. There are two statutes. One said that you 
can't deposit junk or debris in a national park. And so here 
we have a national park. I guess it's running along the Texas-
Mexico border and we have people who left water—plastic 
water containers in this wildlife preserve or this national 
park with the expectation that they might come back and 
refill them and drink it. Well, is that depositing debris in the 
protected area? All right. That's a statutory ambiguity to have 
to try to figure out whether that's debris. Maybe it's not 
debris, they're going to drink out of it. But maybe it is 
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because, I don't know, a coyote might try to eat it and choke 
or something like this. All right. 
 In the other—the other ambiguous statute, you have 
a police officer who admittedly, knowingly distributed 
confidential law enforcement material to a non-
governmental actor—that would never happen now, but it 
was a hypothetical. And the question is, when the statute 
says if you knowingly violate the standards and you're 
guilty, do you have to prove not only that he knew that he 
was distributing the confidential information to somebody 
who wasn't a law enforcement official, but knew that a 
violation would be something for which he could be 
punished. It's a classic mistake of law problem. Right. We 
see these kinds of things all the time. And sometimes it 
comes out one way and it knowingly applies not to the law, 
but only to the facts. And sometimes the other way, you have 
to know about the law. So we had that ambiguity too.  
 Now, again, we had experimental manipulation 
[indiscernible]. Right. These have to do with the identity of 
the parties. Right. So in the first case, where the issue is 
whether leaving the water—refillable water containers in the 
park is to be depositing debris. In one condition, the study 
was told that these were construction workers and maybe the 
people who are going to build President Trump's wall. Right. 
In the other condition, they were told that these were 
immigrants' rights activists who were worried that when 
people were trying to cross the border illegally, they might 
get thirsty and want to drink from these containers. 
 And no matter how you feel about the motivations 
of the actors, whether they're construction workers or 
immigrant aide workers, it doesn't make any difference to 
what the outcome is. The question is just whether when you 
leave the plastic bottle, refillable bottles in the desert, you're 
depositing debris. 
 In the second case with the disclosure, we vary the 
identity of the party to whom the disclosure was being made. 
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Right. So in one case, we had the officer who knew he was 
distributing the confidential information, giving it to a pro-
life counseling center and saying, watch out, right, there's an 
abortion rights advocate who is trying to apply under false 
pretenses to work with you, so you better be careful. And in 
the pro-choice condition, the same thing, the officer 
saying—that they're telling the pro-choice facility, watch 
out, there's an abortion rights advocate who is trying to apply 
to sabotage your efforts. And, again, that doesn't really have 
any bearing whatsoever on the legal standard. All right. You 
have to determine whether his knowing violation is required 
or not.  
 But we did expect that that manipulation, as well as 
the one in the first case, could give a lot of motivation, 
unconscious most likely, to construe the reading of the 
statute to the position that was consistent with the identity of 
the study subjects. And so we're going to see that the relative 
impact of the manipulation on members of the public, 
students, lawyers, and judges. And so to start with the public 
and the judges, here's what we found. That in the layperson's 
standpoint, you saw again that people were polarizing 
depending on what condition they were in, and in ways that 
were congenial—held congenial to their own cultural values. 
They did that in both of these cases. 
 Judges, however, they weren't very different from 
each other. Right. They're converging on a particular 
outcome, no violation in the littering case regardless of who 
it is. And the same with the disclosure case. Right. It's a 
violation of the law regardless of the condition, regardless of 
their values. 
 Now, I can have a fancy statistical model, like this, 
where they put little asterisks down here that say, see, now 
you know, you better believe me, or something like this. If 
somebody does that, if they give you a chart like this and tell 
you that their conclusions have been satisfied, demand your 
money back. Right. That's what I'm going to do, have you to 
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demand your money back. So what you have to do is that 
this kind of information, it's not even by—it is by itself 
intelligible or easy to understand for somebody who is 
actually familiar with how these statistical models work. It's 
come up with some way that represent what the elements of 
the model mean in practical terms. All right. 
 So here's what I do. I use a simulation. This is kind 
of how Nate Silver determines who's going to win the 
election. I wouldn't say that given that he [indiscernible] job 
for the last time. Right. But you plug the values into the 
model that reflects whatever set of conditions you want it to 
test for. Right. And maybe you say, well, I want a 
hierarchical individualist that's a judge in the immigrant 
rights component, the control group would end the littering 
problem, and the formula—the model will spit out the 
answer. Right. But it does it with a kind of spitting. It doesn't 
do it with its hand. It hands out an answer with kind of a 
shaky hand. Right. So it imposes a little bit of random noise 
into the estimate reflecting the overall error in the model's 
various components. And it does that once. And then it does 
it again and again and again, about a thousand times. And 
then you can represent what the entire probability 
distribution is for somebody like that coming up with a 
conclusion to find a violation. So the hierarchical—if they're 
a hierarchical individualist in the construction group, you're 
not very—well, forty percent likely to find that there was a 
violation, well, plus or minus seven percent. 
 If you're a hierarchical individualist in the 
immigrant rights condition, well, then you're much more 
likely to find a violation. It's seventy-five percent. So that's 
a difference in thirty-four percentage points. If you're an 
egalitarian communitarian and you're in the immigrant rights 
condition, it looks like you're around fifty percent. But you're 
twenty-seven percentage points behind the hierarchical 
individualist for whom the conviction outcome was much 
more culturally congenial than it was to the egalitarian 
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communitarian. 
 And the egalitarian communitarian in the 
construction scenario, twenty-three percentage points 
difference between what the egalitarian communitarian 
would have found in the immigrant rights conditions. So 
they're polarizing. Right. It looks a lot like the last study. 
And you get similar kinds of results, polarization in the 
disclosure case. Right. 
 Now, let's look at the judges. You see, they're all 
smooshed [sic] up against each other. There's very little 
difference in what's going on in the littering version of the 
problem. It doesn't matter to whom—who the parties were 
to the judges. Right. No significant differences. But they're 
all basically of a piece—one piece of mind on what the 
outcome should be in the disclosure case. So those are pretty 
strong results showing that the public is subject to the 
identity protective cognition kinds of influences, but the 
judges aren't. And you can kind of generalize this, call this 
the identity protective cognition impact. 
 I mean, how many percentage points more likely is 
someone to find a violation if the person was assigned to the 
condition in which a violation would be congenial to that 
person's cultural outlooks, as opposed to the condition in 
which the finding of the violation wouldn't be congenial to 
that person. And it's about twenty-two percentage points for 
a member of the public—twenty-two percentage points more 
likely to find it's a violation if it's congenial culturally than 
non-congenial. And for the judges, that's minus five percent, 
plus or minus twelve percent. It's not meaningfully different 
from zero. And you've got a pretty big spread between the 
members of the public, twenty-seven percentage points more 
likely to be influenced by the congeniality of the conditions 
than are the judges. 
 We could look at the students and lawyers briefly. 
The lawyers, they look a lot like the judges. Right. They're 
basically agreeing on what the outcome should be regardless 
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of their values and regardless of what condition they're 
assigned to. The students, they're looking a little bit more 
like members of the public. The effect isn't as big. But, you 
know, that's why if there are any students here, we charge 
you this much for your tuition so that you can get to be like 
the lawyers and the judges and be perfectly neutral. It takes 
a lot of work, at least three years of law school. So this is 
the—you can do it too with simulations if you like. So judges 
and lawyers don't see things the way that ordinary members 
of the public do. 
 And I'm going to try a little experiment here because 
this is relevant. What's the mechanism and what's going on? 
Why should we understand judges and lawyers to be 
resisting these kinds of influences? And I guess the question 
in the first study, can you tell—this is a baby chick. Do you 
think it's male or female? Can you tell just by looking? Do 
we have any chick sexers in the audience? Well, you're 
laughing, but you wouldn't be if the chick sexers all went on 
strike because that would be really devastating to the poultry 
industry. 
 You see, chick sexers, they perform this extremely 
important function when the baby chick is just a few hours 
old. They're segregating the male from the female ones. And 
see, the female ones, well, they're going to have juicier meat. 
They're going to lay eggs. The male ones, they're going to 
peck at the female ones and they're not very good for eating 
and they don't produce the eggs. Well, you keep a few who 
lead a kind of privileged existence. The others, you're just 
tossing them away. And they're coming down a conveyor 
belt, okay. And if it's male, you throw it in that—and these 
guys are ninety-nine percent accurate.  
 And what makes this kind of astonishing is there's 
no visually ascertainable difference between the anatomical 
parts in question for male and female chicks at this stage of 
life. And you ask a chick sexer, how do you do this. And if 
he's honest, he goes, I don't know, you know. Somebody else 
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might say, well, I do it this way, you know, the male chick, 
he always tries to distract you. And he says something like 
how many games out of first place are the Red Sox, or 
something like that. That's confabulation. That's not what 
you're doing. And we know how somebody became an 
expert chick sexer from the tutelage of a chick sexer grand 
master, right. They went off and the grand master showed 
them slides, male, female, female, male, male. And so finally 
they developed this kind of intuitive sense of who is the male 
and who is the female. 
 Now, this sounds kind of exotic and weird, but it's 
not. In fact, it's completely mundane and ubiquitous. This is 
a psychological mechanism known as pattern recognition 
where you try to classify a potential instance of some thing, 
like a baby chick's gender based on a mental inventory that's 
richly stocked with examples because you've been doing this 
for a long time, and it's all over the place. That's how we read 
each other's emotions. It's how people in aerial surveillance 
when they look at the photos can tell Cuba is putting 
missiles—Russians are putting missiles in Cuba and maybe 
it will happen again soon. Right? 
 But here's—what—this is what happens, you see, 
when you go to the law school. Well, Karl Llewellyn had a 
theory very much like this, and this is one of Dean Koch's 
favorite writers. Karl Llewellyn called it situation sense, 
right, that you're immersed in the—with the culture of the 
law. And you start to develop these sensibilities to classify 
situations and then determine what the right result is. And 
that's why you get the tremendous convergence among 
lawyers and judges on admittedly vague kinds of statutes. 
Right? So that's what law school is. Right. It's the proximate 
causation, unreasonable restraint of trade, material 
misrepresentation. You keep showing the slides. You keep 
showing the examples and eventually students are going to 
get this kind of thing. 
 And that's what's going on, at least that's what I—
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the theory we had when we did this study, that there's this 
kind of ingrained professional judgment that judges are 
going to have because they're immersed in a certain kind of 
culture that started with going to law school, but continued 
after that. And, you know, that's judges seeing things 
different from how ordinary members of the public do. But 
we still have this little proviso, except when they don't see 
things differently. And, you know, we also measure the 
cultural outlooks, as I've said, of the subjects in this study. 
Usually we use this measure to try to understand why people 
are fighting about different kinds of risks. And so it turns out 
that members of these groups, they form kind of clusters of 
perceptions about risk; environmental risk, guns and gun 
control, gays in the military, gay parenting, marijuana 
legalization, HPV vaccination. All the kinds of hot-button 
issues that you're careful when you first meet somebody and 
you don't get into that until you know them a little better. 
 And we did that for the judges in this case. And the 
public and the students, they both showed the characteristic 
polarizations on the issue of whether global warming was 
happening, right, but so did the lawyers and so did the 
judges. And the public was divided on legalization of 
marijuana. There's really not that much difference in how 
students, lawyers, and judges saw things. And so you get a 
sense, if the reason that judges are able to be neutral is that 
they have this situation sense that is a consequence of being 
immersed in the culture of the law. But when you're outside 
of that domain, there's no reason to expect them to be any 
different from anybody else. And that was true of our judges. 
So it's a kind of domain specific immunity. It's not the—it's 
not that the judges became superheroes because they're 
always kind of pumping justice in the weight room or 
something and they're never going to be experiencing any 
bias. But when they do their job, then they apply the habits 
of mind that are instinctive to what they're doing. So 
sometimes they actually do see things the way the public 
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does. 
 Now, you can see why this is generally good, 
because it means that if a judge is assessing the kinds of 
issues that might arise on remand in Shirley's case, whether 
the protestors crossed the line on the non-communicative 
harm principle, they should be able to do that pretty well. 
And, in fact, that case came out eight to one in the Supreme 
Court.4 And just a couple terms later, there was a Supreme 
Court case in Massachusetts that had a very protective or 
restrictive, depending on how you look at it, provision on 
how close people can come to people at the abortion clinic 
to try to influence them.5 And they said, no, you can't do that. 
It was a nine to zero opinion.6 And they said you've got to 
follow the kind of standards that are in the Freedom of 
Access to Clinic[] [Entrances] Act, which is what's on the 
right.7 And so that's pretty good. Judges are being pretty 
neutral. But here it can also be kind of bad sometimes. 
 And I'll give you an example, from trial 
administration—and it's another study actually that we did 
in Scott v. Harris8. The issue was whether when the police 
use deadly force against a fleeing motorist, meaning 
ramming their car into his and causing it to spin out, it's 
clearly deadly force. Are they justified in using deadly force 
under the Fourth Amendment under those circumstances? 
And there was a video, right, of the chase. And the late 
Justice Scalia said that's the scariest thing I've seen since The 
French Connection,9 right, and he probably hasn't even seen 
a movie since The French Connection. 
 And then you had Justice Stevens—you know, 
                                                 
4 Snyder, 562 U.S. 443. 
5 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120E (2012), invalidated by McCullen v. 
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
6 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518. 
7 Id. at 2357. 
8 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
9 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) 
(No. 05-1631). 
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Justice Breyer, the same thing, said he almost wet his pants 
when he saw it.10 It was terrifying. And we had one justice, 
right, Justice Stevens who said, well, that didn't scare me. 
That's the way it looks when I'm really in a hurry to make it 
to court when you have to pass somebody on a two-lane 
road.11 You know, some kind of Mr. Magoo or something 
like that. I knew you guys would get that. And so, you know, 
all he could do was say thank you to Justice Scalia and to 
Justice Stevens because they decided that people should just 
decide for themselves. And this is the first Supreme Court 
decision with a hyperlink in it.12 Watch the video and decide 
for yourself. They both are convinced it's going to come out 
this way. 
 And, again, we have a model. We gave this to fifteen 
hundred people. And we can simulate how different kinds of 
jurors would react. Right. So you've got Ron who lives in 
Arizona, and he doesn't like the government touching his 
junk, right. But he's still relatively hierarchical and has 
strong opinions about who should do what in the household 
and so forth. And then we've got Bernie, who is a—he was 
even for several years before Bernie ran for president, a 
professor in Vermont who has very kind of hands-off views 
about regulations. People should be allowed to use 
marijuana and so forth. But if people are having trouble, the 
government should help them—he's got a kind of socialist 
orientation. Then there's Linda, who's a social worker in 
Philadelphia and she goes along with Bernie on a lot of 
issues except drugs. She thinks kids have to have more 
discipline. And, finally, there's Pat; and Pat, well, is sort of 
average in social outlook, average in income and average in 
gender. Pat is the survey mean, right, just an average 
American who doesn't exist. You see, people have opinions 
that reflect who they are. And there's nobody who is just a 
                                                 
10 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
11 See id. at 390 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. at 378 n.5 (majority opinion). 
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little bit of everything. Right. Ron, very likely to agree with 
the Supreme Court's outcome on the issue—the factual issue 
that the driver in Scott v. Harris was posing a deadly risk to 
others. Right. Then you've got Linda and Bernie who have a 
little bit more noise in their simulated values. But they think 
that's—no, and that's not—they're not very likely to find that 
outcome. And then there's, of course, Pat. And Pat's closer 
to Ron. 
 But here's the issue, right, whether when you have 
people disagreeing like this, is the disagreement sufficiently 
strong and you're just going to basically have summary 
judgment, which is what the Supreme Court ruled in that 
case, eight to one. Right. That it would be summary 
judgment because no reasonable juror could watch the tape 
and come to any other conclusion, but that this guy was a 
death machine on wheels. Right. No, it's not true. People 
who have different experiences, different identities, they 
might come to a different outcome. Maybe they're going to 
lose, you know, but the question is whether they should have 
a—at least have a chance to be heard by people in the 
community who don't agree with them and at least get a 
chance to maybe tell them why they feel differently. It can't 
be the case that summary judgment is warranted because the 
views of people like Bernie and Linda are just not 
reasonable. These are reasonable people. 
 And I think this is a consequence of—really of 
situation sense. The judges don't see things the way members 
of the public do. And when they have to predict what 
members of the public might think, they're at a risk of error 
that they're going to be imposing their own outlooks on that 
prediction. They need to do a better job on that. 
 The second problem is I think even more 
significant. I call it the neutrality communication problem. 
And, again, I want to go on a little detour here and get into 
science communication because my lab also studied both 
kinds of issues. And we wanted to know, well, how do 
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people form their understandings of scientific incentives on 
these kinds of issues. So what we did was we showed them, 
right, three people who look like they're pretty much experts 
on their subject matters. But they're—well, they all went to 
good schools. One went to a really great school. It's in my 
contract. I have to say stupid things like that whenever Yale 
and Harvard are on the same slide. Right. But they all went 
to elite schools. They're on the faculty at these prestigious 
universities. All members of the National Academy of 
Sciences. And we say, well, do you think that this is a 
genuine expert on the issue of climate change or, you know, 
gun control or nuclear waste. Right.  
 And we picked those issues because we know that 
people are very divided in these two cultural groups. But we 
also, again, have an experimental component. We tell half 
the people that the featured scientist is taking the high-risk 
position, that climate change is happening and there's 
consensus on it and we're going to die if we don't do 
something versus the low risk. Right. The computer models, 
they're subject to error. It's too early to say. We shouldn't do 
anything precipitous. Right. The kinds of arguments that 
they recognize.  
 The same thing with nuclear waste, high risk to put 
the waste in deep geologic isolation. No, low risk, that's been 
determined to be perfectly safe. And the same thing under 
the concealed—carry concealed guns. They make crime 
rates go up because more people are armed and there's going 
to be accidents and there could be deadly confrontations. No, 
it's going to make the crime rate go down because if you 
don't know, right, whether anybody you're dealing with is 
packing heat, you're kind of on your best behavior. You don't 
want to piss them off or anything. You're laughing so I know 
they're cultural orientation on that one. Right. Because what 
happened is that people when they're making these 
judgments about, is this really an expert on this issue, they're 
much more likely to form the judgment that the person was 
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a genuine expert when we depicted the expert as taking the 
position that was dominant in their cultural group. 
 All right. These are [indiscernible] seventy-two 
percentage points more likely to find that this is an expert 
when you're an egalitarian communitarian if it's in the global 
warming condition and the person says it's dangerous. Right. 
Similarly [indiscernible] effects for all of these issues. Now, 
this is just like, or very similar to, they saw a game. Right. 
People who have these different kinds of group 
commitments, they're looking at evidence that they're 
drawing some issue that divided their group from another. 
And they're selectively crediting it or not crediting it, 
depending on whether it's consistent with their group's view. 
Right. 
 That's why we have what I call the [indiscernible] 
communication problem, the persistence of strong partisan 
disagreement over issues of simple fact, right, that can be 
determined by empirical methods. And in some cases, have 
already been extensively studied. Right. Because you're 
filtering the information in a way that will make what you 
believe, what you think the facts are support your group's 
position on these kinds of issues. 
 Now, you have that because, you see, members of 
the public don't have the same kind of professional 
judgment. They don't have the inventory of prototypes that 
the scientists do. Right. If the scientists are perfectly neutral, 
then they're not going to be seen that way by members of the 
public who have these different kinds of outlooks. People 
aren't going to converge on what the best evidence is. 
 The same thing is happening, you see, in the law. 
Right. People see one of these charged issues like involving 
protests, for example. And for them, their own eyes are 
telling them, this is what happened. Right. And, you know, 
it doesn't matter it was eight to one in Shirley's case, nine to 
zero in McCullen v. Coakley.13 Okay. People are going to 
                                                 
13 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
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say, how could the justices do this? How could the State 
Supreme Court justices do this? How could a trial court—I 
can see it with my own eyes, they must be biased. And as 
these things accumulate, everybody becomes convinced that 
the courts are political, even if they're not. Right. And not 
surprisingly, right, whether you think that they're being 
political on the liberal side, well, yes, if you're a 
conservative. Or they're being political on the conservative 
side, yes, if you're a liberal, but not if you're a conservative. 
So you get the same kind of disagreement about whether the 
court itself is being political and why. 
 And this can very positively account for the 
declining public confidence in courts. The courts are being 
political. Even if they're not, right. Well, the judges—new 
proposition here, judges and lawyers need to learn to see 
what ordinary members of the public see as part of their 
professional craft, right. The same way—doing good 
science, is that the same thing as communicating what it 
means? Because doing good science depends on the kinds of 
habits that modern scientists have that most of the public 
don't. So you use the kinds of techniques that I have been 
showing you to try to figure out how to communicate science 
so that the validity of it is recognized by people who don't 
have the kinds of insights that the scientists do. 
 Well, there's a neutrality communication problem. 
No matter how impartial courts are being on these kinds of 
hot-button issues, it is the case that members of the public 
who don't like the results are going to see it as politically 
biased. Well, we need a new science of traditional neutrality 
communication. Just doing good judging doesn't by itself 
certify to members of the public that it's good judging or that 
it's neutral. But that's something that we ought to address 
within our profession, and starting with the education of law 
students. 
 So what should we do in that regard? Well, you tell 
me. You have more understanding of this as judges, as 
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practicing lawyers—you know what they say about those 
who can do and those who would rather not because it's so 
easy and fun to teach law, or something like that. But your 
intuitions are better than mine. You know, is there something 
with opinion writing? Is it the kind of common exaggeration 
that we know that eight—judges in the majority says, 
eighteen arguments, they all come out this way. A judge 
says, eighteen arguments, they all come out that way. Right. 
And maybe in a Supreme Court, which is already selecting 
the cases based on whether there's disagreement about it in 
the lower courts. It can't be the case, it's that simple. But they 
always—the judge is always right that it is that way. Maybe 
that has an impact on people who will believe that the 
decision is wrong, that there's no convincing of any kind of 
uncertainty. I don't know. This is what judges have told me 
you might want to consider. Or maybe that you would have 
some kind of additional public outreach so that people could 
learn more about the decisions in terms that they could 
understand and evaluate them as to whether they're neutral 
or not. Maybe a judicial selection criteria should reflect 
something like this. I don't know.  
 We should do things in legal education. Well, what? 
Right. What we really need is the creation of evidence-based 
capacity and practice in the judiciary. We look—where the 
judges and lawyers traffic in facts, the system that we 
attribute to is supposed to ascertain the truth. Well, we 
should use the kinds of empirical methods that are 
appropriate for assessing the performance of ourselves to see 
whether we, in fact, are projecting—teaching people about 
facts, ensuring that facts govern in the cases that we decide. 
All right. 
 So you tell me what would be a good way to help 
address this question, and then I'll help you by measuring 
and using the same kinds of methods that I've been talking 
to you about today. And that brings us to the close with the 
highlight on Pat, a very important member of our project. 
25
et al.: In the Eye of the Beholder
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2017
